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Abstract:  Research  on  public  good  auctions  is  intended  to  initiate  development  on  new 
approaches  to  finance  public  goods,  beyond  government  and  philanthropic  efforts.  The 
researchers evaluate the potential to identify economic value for a subset of ecosystem services 
and markets that have the potential to provide for them. Empirical analysis focuses on public 
valuation for three specific types of ecosystem activities (bird habitat, sea grass restoration and 
shellfish restoration) in coastal Virginia. Data was collected using a field experiment employing 
an  experimental  auction  approach  with  mechanisms  to  reduce  free  riding  often  seen  in  the 
experimental  economics  literature.  These  incentive  mechanisms  are  applied  to  individual 
restoration  activities  and  willingness  to  pay  estimates  are  compared  to  a  baseline  choice 
experiment  that  employs  an  incentive  compatible,  majority  vote  mechanism  and  actual  (not 
hypothetical) money payments.  A conditional logit model, rooted in McFadden’s choice theory, 
is used to examine the trade-offs between ecosystem restoration activities to estimate willingness 
to pay, while interval regressions are applied to individualized price auctions. Linear and non-
linear models are estimated to check for validity and sensitivity to scope.   
 
 






Increased  demands  on  our  ecosystems,  due  to  development  and  population  growth,  are 
threatening  many  environmental  goods  and  the  amenities  associated  with  well  functioning 
ecosystems. While few to no markets exist for ecosystem services that provide public goods and 
are not traditional commodities, such as habitat services provided by healthy sea grass beds or 
water quality benefits associated with clam habitats, consumer preferences can provide insight to 
managers and policymakers on how to prioritize limited funding and make trade-offs between 
restoration  priorities.  This  study  explores  ways  to  generate  revenues  for  these  goods  via 
exploring individual willingness to pay for specific ecosystem restoration activities and auction 
methods by which such willingness to pay might be translated into revenues (for provision of 
ecosystem restoration). 
 
Results  and  insights  into  such  preferences  and  valuations  are  potentially  useful  for  private 
enterprises looking to establish new markets, philanthropic organizations who regularly solicit 
voluntary contributions from the public, and policy makers looking to establish a better balance 
between the public value of environmental quality and the alternative uses of environmental 
resources.  
 
Using  mechanisms  known  to  alleviate  free  riding,  we  explore  how  different  rules  impact 
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3 
such willingness to pay might be translated into revenues. One set of incentives establishes an 
incentive-compatible choice, in which strategic incentives are consistent with truthfully revealing 
the full value (full willingness to pay) for the alternative that an individual prefers most.  For 
example, in a choice among two alternative sets of restoration activities and required payments 
from the individual, a voting institution with majority rule is incentive compatible because each 
voter’s  best  strategy  is  to  vote  for  the  alternative  that  he  or  she  would  most  prefer  to  see 
implemented  (Bagnoli  and  Lipman  1989;  Swallow  et  al.  2008).    An  individualized  pricing 
approach,  grounded in marginal benefit theory, is then compared to an incentive compatible 
scenario. Integrating an individualized pricing mechanism into the public goods research agenda 
has  the  potential  for  generating  more  accurate  estimates  of  individual  and  community 
willingness-to-pay for environmental restoration activities, including the ecosystem services well 
functioning ecosystems provide.  
 
Our objective was to answer the following questions:  
 
(1) Can (Lindahl’s) individualized prices be established for local public goods?  
(2) How might the individualized pricing approach perform relative to other institutions for 
public good provision? 
(3) Do alternative incentive mechanisms have different impacts in reducing free-riding or 





This preliminary report concerns a field experiment in economics.  The field execution of this 
experiment involved approximately 85 residents of Virginia’s Eastern Shore. Participants were 
provided  with  a  budget  constraint  between  $90  and  $150.  Any  money  not  offered  towards 
restoration  activities  could  be  designated  as  cash  to  be  taken  home  by  the  participant.  
Participants made decisions involving local public goods (e.g., half-acre increments of ecosystem 
restoration for sea grass habitat, bird habitat and clams for water quality) and were informed of 
the ecosystem services that may result from additional ecosystem restoration associated with 
each activity. For instance, this information included the additional habitat and oxygen resulting 
from  more  sea  grass  restoration  or  the  critical  migratory  sites  and  ecotourism  opportunities 
resulting from bird habitat or the increased water clarity resulting from clam restoration (see Fig. 
2 for example of ecosystem services outlined to participants).   
  
IC Mechanism 
In order to examine the preferences and willingness to pay of environmental restoration activities 
under  an  individualized  pricing  scenario,  a  baseline  incentive  compatible  scenario  is  first 
constructed and examined. In these valuation experiments, individual participants were asked to 
make commitments, with real money, under rules of trade that align the individual’s incentives 
so that their best strategy is to make choices consistent with the full value they place on the 
alternatives.  Carlsson and Martinsson (2001) provide a precedent for using this type of choice 
experiment for actual provision of public goods.  
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For this task, participants were asked to make decisions between bundles of restoration activities 
in order to establish baseline values, via marginal substitution between ecosystem restoration 
activities. Using an efficient design approach, each participant received 8 pair-wise choices that 
contained four variables (birds, clams, sea grass and personal cost) with four possible levels; 
environmental  goods  ranged  from  0-3  increments  and  the  money  variable  had  4  levels  of 
percentage possible for restoration, the remainder as cash returned to the individual. The pilot ran 
with  a  50  person  group,  split  into  two  groups  of  25  at  random.  We  identified  these  groups 
through a simple system of 1-25, 31-55 id numbers. Within each group, an individual could have 
a budget of $90 or $120, alternating with id #’s and each sub-group of $90 or $120, there were 4 
levels of restoration percentage that could be possible. The two groups faced the same choice 
questions in reverse order, allowing for a test of the ordering effect.  These choices involved real 
monetary allocations and real actions for ecosystem restoration. 
 
The bundle of restoration that will be provided is modeled on a traditional voting institution, 
where majority decision determines the outcome. Thus, in a choice among two alternative sets of 
restoration  activities  and  required  payments  from  the  individual,  a  voting  institution  with 
majority  rule  is  incentive  compatible  because  each  voter’s  best  strategy  is  to  vote  for  the 
alternative that he or she would most prefer to see implemented (Bagnoli and Lipman 1989; 
Swallow et al. 2008). 
 
The experiment conducted under task one asks participants to choose between two bundles (or 
alternatives)  from  a  choice  set.    Each  bundle  is  comprised  of  half-acre  units  of  restoration 
activities (e.g. sea grass restoration, bird habitat restoration, clam restoration for water quality) 
and an amount of money the individual was asked to pay towards the implementation of that 
bundles’ activities.  Each participant is presented with 8 choice sets, following an orthogonal 
fractional factorial design (Addelman and Kempthorne 1961).  By causing individuals to choose 
between pairs of bundles, this task elicits preferences that indicate individuals’ preferred trade-
offs between the restoration activities or attributes of different bundles and enables the researcher 
to estimate willingness-to-pay for restoration.   
 
All 8 of the paired choice sets could be implemented through contracts with firms that restore 
ecosystems, so all choices could be “real.”  However, due to budget limitations, the research did 
inform  respondents,  after  individuals  answer  all  8  questions,  that  only  one  question  will  be 
chosen, at random, for implementation; by this approach, data from all 8 questions can be treated 
as  a  real  choice  since  participants  know  the  outcome  of  any  one  question  could  affect  real 
restoration.  Such choice experiments are rooted in random utility modeling (Lancaster 1966; 
Hardie and Strand 1979).  A conditional logit model, founded in McFadden’s choice theory 
(1974), is used to examine the trade-offs between ecosystem restoration activities to estimate 
willingness  to  pay.    Linear  and  non-linear  models  are  estimated  to  check  for  validity  and 
sensitivity to scope.   
 
Individualized Pricing Mechanism 
Additional information was collected for each restoration activity using an individualized price 
experimental auction.  Lindahl first proposed a system for individualized pricing of public goods 
in 1919, based on an individuals’ marginal cost being equal to the marginal benefit they receive 
from provision of the good (Nicholson 2005). The sum of all the marginal payments (offers) DRAFT: May 3, 2010 
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establishes  the  Pareto  optimal
1  level  of  the  good  provided  (Samuelson  1954).  Theoretically, 
Lindahl’s approach can reach a Pareto optimal level of public good provision, if each individual 
were to reveal their full value (Groves and Ledyard 1977),  yet it has been thought to be near 
impossible to produce offers sufficient to provide for the goods in actuality (Nicholson 2005).  
Using incentive mechanisms from the experimental economics literature discussed below, this 
research  will test the feasibility of  an individualized pricing system, motivated by  Lindahls’ 
marginal benefit theory.   
 
Participants faced a series of questions about how much they would be willing to pay to support 
a given level of a restoration activity, incrementally. In other words, they were asked how much 
they would offer for a single unit of restoration activity, then for two units of the same activity 
and so on. In all cases, the participant was provided $100-$150 with which to make decisions. 
Any money not offered towards incremental restoration activities was designated as cash to be 
taken home. In this way, if a participant decided to offer, for example, $90 for a single unit of 
restoration, they would be able to take $10 home if this was the highest amount of restoration 
provided by the group.  
 
Rules for provision drew on established methods in experimental economics, notably methods 
for threshold public goods that involve a provision point or target of funds that must be raised to 
enable provision of the good.  Participants were instructed that incremental provision for each 
good would happen only if the group offered enough funds to pay for the restoration activity. If 
enough funds were offered to pay for a single unit, then the auctioneer determined if enough 
funds were available to pay for two units based on each participant’s incremental decision, and 
so on. The actual levels of ecosystem restoration provided are based on aggregate willingness to 
pay  reaching  a  pre-determined  (but  unknown  to  the  participants)  provision  point,  or  cost  of 
implementing the project. This aggregate determination is done for each infra-marginal unit of 
restoration, based on the rules of the incentive mechanism, and no level of restoration can be 
implemented  if  the  aggregate  offers  did  not  reach  the  provision  point.  In  this  way  we  are 
simulating an auction-like experience where participants willingness to pay (offers) on a given 
level of restoration is matched with the amount they have to pay for any level of restoration.  
 
Previous  research  in  the  experimental  economics  literature  has  shown  that  individuals  will 
increase  donations  to  a  public  good  project  if  the  payment  rules  reduce  the  incentives  for 
individuals  to  ‘free  ride’  (benefit  without  paying  towards  the  cost  of  provision)  on  the 
contributions of others (Isaac et. al. 1989; Bagnoli and Lipman 1989; Davis and Holt 1993; 
Ledyard  1995;  Holt  2007),    Additionally,  individuals  have  been  shown  to  contribute  more 
towards  a  project  if  there  is  a  provision  point  and  money  back  guarantee.    Under  these 
conditions, the public good is supplied only if a pre-specified amount of money (the provision 
point) is raised, and participants receive their money back if the market fails to raise that amount.  
(Bagnoli and McKee 1991; Marks and Croson 1998; Cadsby and Maynes 1999; Poe et al. 2002; 
Das 2007; Spencer et al. 2009)  
 
Such that, a single unit decision earnings are based on the equation,  
                                                 
1 A Pareto optimal level of provision is one where it is impossible for any individual to be made better off without 
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   where,  
Ei  Participant i’s earnings, dependent on whether or not the provision point was reached 
Mi  Participant i’s budget (provided)  
Ci  Participant i’s contribution or offer 
∑Cj  Sum of contributions from all members of the group 
Vi  Participants value or return when the good is provided, i.e., when the provision point was 
reached.  
 
Alternative  mechanisms  are  evaluated  in  order  to  assess  whether  decision-making  is  altered 
when the rules differ on the marginal unit. The proportional rebate (PR) mechanism has been 
shown  to  generate  revenues  sufficient  for  the  public  good  (Spencer  et  al.  2009;  Marks  and 
Croson 1998). PR requires that the provision point be met and returns any money in excess of the 
provision point to the participants in proportion to their offer, on the infra-marginal unit. The PR 
mechanism is examined both with and without an opportunity for participants to revise their 
offers on any units not provided by initial auction rounds. A secondary mechanism, the Pivotal 
Mechanism (PM) also uses a provision point. However, PM requires participant payment on the 
marginal unit, only if it is expressly needed to reach the provision point and provide the good.  
The  PM  has  attractive  incentive  compatible  qualities  but  has  not  been  shown  to  generate 
sufficient funds for provision (Swallow et al 2008).  
 
 
Results / Analysis 
 
Description of study population (pilot and 2009 field experiment) 
More than half the respondents were women (55%). The average age was 50, with a range 
between 23 and 72 and average residency of 13.6 years, with a range between 1 and 45 years. 
The majority of our sample owned their own home (89%) and had some college or more.  While 
not representative of the regional population, this sample is representative of those that 
contribute to environmental projects, as did 80% of our sample. More than half of the sample 
self-identified as being recreational fishermen and bird watchers (56% and 58%, respectively), 
with only 20% self-identifying as recreational hunters and 4% as commercial fishers. Two 
sessions of the 2009 field test were conducted, income distribution for both is in table 1. While 
some differences existed between the two sessions, session 2 did have more participants with 
incomes greater than 75k. Overall, the majority of participants in both sessions have incomes that 
are less than 50k.  
  
IC Model 
Analysis to-date indicates that participants did reveal support for higher quantities (e.g., more 
acres) of ecosystem restoration, yet the average individual did not show a statistically significant 
difference in value for alternative restoration types, as seen in table 2, estimated using a 
conditional logit model.  Preliminary results and participant feedback indicate that factors DRAFT: May 3, 2010 
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beyond the purely theoretical assessment of incentive compatible properties (such as framing 
effects or science-information) may have played an integral role in individuals’ choices (votes).    
Additionally, the sign on the individual personal cost coefficient is positive, indicating that 
participants were not making decisions consistent with theory, although results from the 
remainder of the pilot do suggest results consistent with decreasing marginal benefit theory. With 
this in mind, the 2009 field experiment included additional science information in early 
instructions and reminders that money not used for restoration was money that they could take 
home. Results from this field experiment (table 3) also show similarities between the restoration 
activity coefficients but a change in sign (now negative and consistent with theory) on individual 
personal cost.  
 
Individualized pricing 
Session two of the pilot field experiment used a process to identify marginal (or individualized) 
prices for increments of each of the ecosystem restoration activities (e.g., sea-grass, birds, 
clams). This was done by asking participants to complete a series of decisions to offer a per-
increment price for additional units of restoration with the researcher evaluating whether the sum 
of per-unit prices exceeded the costs of providing each unit. As in the first session, participants 
were given a $100 endowment or budget within which to make decisions.  
 
An interval regression is used to analyze the individualized pricing sections, results are shown in 
table 4. Highlights include the coefficient on new residents (< 10years), both significant and 
negative. Qualitative discussions indicate that those residents who grew up in the community 
(e.g., old residents) may be more likely to support restoration activities. This may be explored 
further in future studies. Despite the variability in income across participants, income (greater 
than/less than $50,000), did not seem to play a role in the marginal willingness to pay for 
incremental units of restoration.  
 
Several mechanisms are tested, including a proportional rebate mechanism, whereby money 
collected from a group that exceeded the total monies needed to provide the public good was 
rebated to individuals in proportion to their offer. In addition, the participants were split into two 
groups, where one group was told, conditional on their decisions for one restoration activity, a 
unit of an additional restoration activity would be provided as long as funds to provide a single 
unit on the first activity were collected. Results from the interval regression show that as the 
number of increments increased, participants’ offered price declines, consistent with the concept 
of diminishing marginal benefits (table 5). The overall shape of the graph held true for each of 
the three ecosystem restoration activities. Additionally, participants making decisions on 
conditional units of ecosystem restoration consistently displayed a higher willingness to pay for 





The study is intended to initiate development on new approaches for financing public goods, 
beyond government and philanthropic efforts. Individualized pricing based on the Lindahl 
approach has long been considered impractical in microeconomics.  This study initiates a direct 
test of this long-held assumption.  Preliminary results suggest it may be possible to generate DRAFT: May 3, 2010 
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sufficient funds for public good provision.  Our  results indicate that participants were making 
decisions consistent with theory while simultaneously generating adequate funds to provide the 
public goods. The methods explored in this study may be most appropriate for localized public 
goods, but there is potential to adapt such incentive mechanisms for use with existing programs 
by which government pays landowners for ecosystem services.  Auction methods could serve as 
an alternative (or complementary approach) to stated preference methods as a means for guiding 











































Table 1: INCOME DISTRIBUTION VCR.LTER 2009  
 
             
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
           
 
Table 2: (Logit) Choice Model: Pilot 
Variable Name  B    Std. Err.  P< 
Birds  0.6530  0.1093  0.001 
Clams  0.6582  0.1336  0.001 
Sea Grass  0.6686  0.1435  0.001 









Table 3: (Logit) Choice Model: 2009 Field Experiment 
Variable Name B    Std. Err. P< 
Birds  2.1942  0.4073  0.001 
Sea Grass  1.8977  0.3845  0.001 
NU2  -0.1029  .0467   0.027 
Individuals’ 
cost 












1 = Under 25k 
2 = 25-40k 
3 = 40-50k 
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Table 4: Interval Regression Results, Individualized Pricing (pilot) 
Variable affecting 
mWTP 
B.  Std. Err  P< 
Constant  42.43    8.859       0.000      
No. of units   -10.83     1.076     0.000     
New Resident (<10yrs)  -26.39     4.135      0.000     
Dummy Clams  2.473   3.090       0.424      
Dummy Birds  2.840     3.115       0.362     
 
Dummy Conditionality  8.917    3.168       0.005      
DConSG*No. Units  -.5323     1.421     0.708     
Female  -5.933    2.501      0.018     
Age  .8774    .1185       0.001      
Education (< B.S.)    11.09     4.502      0.014      
Education (> B.S.)  5.591     4.881     0.252     
Years of residency   -1.489   .1851     0.001     
Dummy if previously 
donate to environmental 
restoration 
-1.319     3.410     0.699     
Dummy if Retired  -1.028     3.202     0.748      
Income <50k  19.24      3.173      0.001      
Income >75k  17.10     2.710       0.001      
 
 
Table 5: Mean responses for Sea Grass (Pilot) 
  Mean  Std Dev  Min   Max 
1 unit  64.24     32.98            0          100 
2   35.78    14.38            0           50 
3  26.15  8.69            0       33.33 
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